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It is tempting to use the term “long and arduous” to describe this program of 
study.  After all, it involved months of heavy mental lifting and many weeks of 
separation from my wonderful family (for whose love, patience and constant 
encouragement I am deeply grateful).  But during those weeks and months, thousands of 
men and women served on the front lines in the fight for freedom, providing my family 
with the safety and security that enabled us to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness with hardly a thought about our own safety.  Those defenders, not I, are the 
ones who know what it means to be separated from family; they know what it is to 
wonder whether they would ever see their friends and loved ones again.  They, not I, 
have earned the right to say long and arduous.  How pitifully inadequate are mere thanks 
to people such as these! 
When we consider those who have not yet returned, those who are returning with 
permanent impairment, and those whose families will never again enjoy their fellowship, 
the sentiment expressed by President Lincoln at Gettysburg becomes even more grand 
than Lincoln himself could have imagined; for these fought not only for the protection of 
their own nation, but so that countless others might taste the freedom which we so often 
take for granted. 
 
It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before 
us–that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause 
for which they gave the last full measure of devotion–that we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain–that this nation, under 
God, shall have a new birth of freedom–and that government of the 
people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. 
President Abraham Lincoln 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the 
memories of those we lost that day.1  
 
A. ENHANCING PREPAREDNESS  
This thesis is about enhancing preparedness to reduce our nation’s vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks.  Specifically, the focus is on the process of creating and executing plans 
in a way that makes the best use of scarce resources for the goals of preventing attacks 
and protecting our citizens and critical infrastructure.  Various planning methods will be 
examined as well as the way that each is challenged by today’s threat environment. 
 
B. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT 
The goal of these pages is to assist with the development of good terrorism 
preparedness plans, but perhaps most importantly, to present a mechanism for continuous 
improvement of those plans, an element that is often overlooked or is insufficiently 
robust, regardless of which planning mechanism is used.  To use a plan for the sole 
purpose of setting initial conditions is fatal.  Without a dynamic, continuously improving 
cycle of planning, we can never hope to stay ahead of a sophisticated adversary who 
knows how to use asymmetric techniques to leverage weakness into strength.  This 
adversary is not satisfied with developing a plan and putting it on the shelf.  Instead, he is 
always scanning the environment (our environment), probing for weaknesses, building 
plans that show promise and dropping those that do not as the environment changes; 
always seeking to avoid the fatal error of becoming fixated on a favorite plan and blinded 
to better ones.  We must do no less. 
If we are to succeed in this preparedness mission, we must understand the dangers 
that are unique to asymmetric conflict and how those dangers require us to change the 
way we plan and operate so that we can maximize our preparedness.  Some of these 
threat characteristics will be presented in Chapter II, The Post-9/11 Threat Environment. 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 323. 
2 
Chapter III, Planning to Plan, will give a brief overview of how defense planning 
has changed since the end of the Cold War, and why the new threat environment has 
forced military and homeland security planners to develop new planning methodologies.   
Chapter IV, Tempo: Using Time as a Tool of Strategy, will demonstrate that 
planning tempo can be just as important as combat tempo in gaining and maintaining 
one’s advantage over an adversary. 
Chapter V, It Takes a Network, will introduce some of the ways that modern 
terrorist organizations have adopted network characteristics and how those characteristics 
present us with unique challenges and opportunities.  One of the lessons of network 
analysis is that we also must adopt certain network-like characteristics if we are to 
succeed in a struggle against a networked adversary. 
New ways of collaborating, planning, tasking intelligence collection and 
disseminating intelligence information will be proposed in Chapter VI, A Model for the 
Future.  The 9/11 Commission’s four-step protocol for planning and intelligence 
collection will be presented, along with the essential element that must be included if 
their protocol is to succeed.  The implications of the decision by Congress to cancel what 
might have been the only serious attempt by a government organization to implement the 
9/11 Commission’s protocol will also be considered. 
To demonstrate the broad applicability of the principles in this document, the 
domestic nuclear weapon facilities owned by the United States Department of Energy 
(DOE) will be used as a case study in Chapter VII, Application to the Department of 
Energy.  DOE has a robust planning strategy that avoids many of the pitfalls of other 
methods.  But as the threat has grown since 9/11, DOE is understandably wrestling with 
new challenges to its dual commitments to be good stewards of the national stockpile of 
nuclear weapons and the taxpayers’ money.  DOE’s planning methodology will be 
presented, along with an analysis of how it might be strengthened using the approach 
described in the following chapters. 
Chapter VIII, Conclusion, will revisit the importance of preparedness and 
planning, and will examine the 9/11 Commission’s “failure of imagination” criticism in 
light of the approach that is recommended in this thesis. 
3 
II. THE POST-9/11 THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
Iraq has become a point of attraction and restorer of (our) energies. 
  – Osama bin Laden2  
 
The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated simply: 
in the new age of terror, they—we—are the primary targets.  The losses 
America suffered that day demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist 
threat and the commensurate need to prepare ourselves to meet it. 
  – The 9/11 Commission3 
 
A. THE ONLY SUPERPOWER 
In 1991, America’s success in Operation Desert Storm served as a wake-up call to 
the world and helped lead us into a new, but significantly more dangerous era.  As global 
news broadcasts showed live coverage of the unbelievable speed and efficiency with 
which the United States defeated one of the largest military forces on earth, there was no 
doubt that the world’s only remaining superpower could not be seriously challenged, 
much less defeated, through conventional means.  Our adversaries have begun using, and 
planning to use, non-conventional means in an effort to force us to respond to their 
political agenda.  Homeland security practitioners must understand the nature and 
implications of this new threat environment. 
 
B. THE POWER OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
If someone had announced in the early hours of September 11, 2001 that they 
would destroy the World Trade Center towers in New York City with a few box cutters 
before the morning was over, it is hard to imagine that anyone would have taken them 
seriously.  And yet that is what happened on that fateful morning.  Such is the power of 
asymmetric conflict.  The combatant who is skilled in asymmetric conflict finds the 
adversary’s weakness and leverages it into overpowering strength.  That weakness can be 
                                                 
2 From transcript of a recording that was broadcast worldwide on January 16, 2006. 
3 The 9/11 Commission Report, 323. 
4 
physical, such as an insufficiently protected asset, or it can be cognitive, such as an 
insufficient understanding or an incorrect assumption.  The attacks of 9/11 exploited both 
types of weakness. 
After the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11, “[t]he threat 
environment expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetric threat from bombers, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and air- or sea-launched cruise missiles to a continuing 
symmetric threat, and an emergent asymmetric threat, which was focused across all 
domains, borders, and agencies.”4  
The above description is particularly useful since it reminds us that the threat 
environment has expanded, and not merely shifted from one type of threat to another.  
The threat of traditional, symmetric, nation-against-nation warfare might not seem 
imminent since 9/11, but it has never gone away. 
In the old era of worrying predominantly about symmetric threats, our satellites 
and spy planes produced images that enabled analysts to count aircraft and troops, to find 
out which military and industrial assets were being moved or changed, and where new 
factories were being built.  The domains and activities of our Cold War opponents were 
so sprawling and slow moving that we were able to maintain a reasonable flow of 
information about our adversary’s strengths and intentions through technical means, 
informants and our own spies.  Such is not the case in the new threat environment. 
 
C. THE “LOW SIGNATURE” ADVERSARY 
The most immediate threat to the homeland is the low-signature adversary.  That 
is, the terrorist who blends in so well with the population he or she plans to attack, that 
there are few, if any, opportunities for the intended victim to get indications or warnings 
before an attack.  Many of the terrorist’s preparations would be considered legal and 
perfectly normal to an observer.  Is the person who is photographing the Golden Gate 
Bridge a tourist or a terrorist?  Is the person who is purchasing chemicals at the farm 
supply store planning to feed thousands or poison them?  Intentions make all the 
                                                 
4 Joseph R. Inge and Eric A. Findley, "North American Defense and Security after 9/11," JFQ, no. 40 
(First quarter 2006): 24-25. 
5 
difference, yet intentions rarely announce themselves in advance, nor do they leave much 
of a paper trail.  Today’s terrorist is not simply willing, but often is planning to die in the 
process of carrying out an attack, a characteristic that is very much unlike traditional, 
symmetric threats.  Terrorists are determined, innovative and able to carry out 
coordinated attacks against multiple targets.  In some cases, the volunteer who will 
become the next suicide bomber might not be selected until the day of the bombing, 
making it virtually impossible to know in advance about planned terrorist operations. 
Ambassador Henry Crumpton, the Department of State’s Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, describes this enemy as transformative, and the new battlefield as 
global and rapidly evolving.  He told Congress that this new enemy is becoming 
increasingly lethal as they learn to deploy in smaller numbers, or perhaps even operate 
remotely.  This enemy sees the war in Iraq as both a training center and an indoctrination 
center for extremists from around the world.  This enemy wants not only to defeat the 
coalition that invaded Iraq, but they want to defeat the very idea of democracy in the 
Middle East.5 
This adversary perfects his deadly skill by participating in, or at least learning 
from, the insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In fact, those operations have 
been characterized as the most effective training ground for terrorists.  Those who survive 
their insurgency operations have become skilled, combat-hardened veterans who may 
then train others and export their terror to other countries. 
 
D. RETHINKING INTELLIGENCE 
Ephraim Kam, reflecting on the phenomenon of surprise attacks, wrote, “History 
does not encourage potential victims of surprise attack.  One can only hope to reduce the 
severity – to be only partly surprised, to issue clearer and more timely warnings, to gain a 
few days for better preparations – and to be more adequately prepared to minimize the 
                                                 
5 Henry A. Crumpton, "U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Update," in House International Relations 
Committee Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation held in Washington, D.C., 
October 27, 2005, U.S. House of Representatives.  Available [online]: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/Oct/28-580190.html. (accessed January 26, 2006). 
6 
damage once a surprise attack occurs.”6  In a similar vein, the respected analyst of the 
Pearl Harbor attack, Roberta Wohlstetter, wrote, “It would be reassuring to believe that 
Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder.  What is disquieting is that it 
was a supremely ordinary blunder.”7 
History tells us that anticipating surprise attacks, even major attacks from a 
symmetric adversary who has thousands of aircraft, tanks and combatants, is difficult to 
do.  Since there is so much evidence to substantiate the difficulty of this problem when 
faced with a large-scale attack, we should not be surprised that it is virtually impossible 
to get advance warning of a low-signature terrorist attack.  Of what use, then, is 
intelligence information in this new era? 
We must rethink how we use intelligence in the post-9/11 era.  Although we 
should not give up trying to develop our intelligence capabilities and sources to the point 
that they can provide us with good indications and warnings, we must never presume that 
those resources will ever be able to tell us the day and hour of an impending attack 
beforehand.  Instead, we must put most of our intelligence efforts and expectations into 
helping us understand our enemy, into helping us know how an attack is likely to occur 
so we can take measures now to harden targets against such attacks.  We must also ensure 
that intelligence and threat information is disseminated as widely as possible so that 
many people can be working together to think of efficient ways to harden our critical 
infrastructure and protect our citizens. 
 
                                                 
6 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), 233. 
7 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1962), vii. 
7 
III. PLANNING TO PLAN 
The Allegan County Board of Commissioners has a plan.  That plan is to 
develop a plan that will help them plan out their long-term strategic 
planning.8  
 
A. CHALLENGES FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY PLANNING 
Any plan worth using is challenging to create.  One reason good planning is hard 
to do is that planning involves contingencies that cannot be precisely defined, and it is 
hard to make a case for significant allocation of resources against “soft” contingencies.  
The need for a new method of defense planning became clear at the end of the Cold War, 
when the United States no longer needed to maintain a force structure that was designed 
primarily to fight a war against one or two nation-states.  The system that has evolved 
since 2001 is applicable, with appropriate modifications, to homeland security. 
 
B. THE RISE OF CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING 
A system called Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) was officially embraced by 
the DoD in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.9  CBP has been defined as “planning, 
under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day 
challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that 
necessitates choice.”10  This definition, has been adopted for use in Department of 
Homeland Security policy, and can be dissected into three basic elements: (1) 
uncertainty, (2) preparation for a wide range of challenges, and (3) an economic 
framework that necessitates choice.  An examination of those elements reveals that CBP  
is not a radically new concept.  Each of those elements has been present in earlier forms 
of defense planning, usually referred to as threat-based or scenario-based planning.  The  
 
                                                 
8 Regan Foster, Holland Sentinel, July 2, 2004. 
9 The timing of the QDR might lead one to the conclusion that it was a reaction to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11.  In fact, the QDR report was almost ready for final publication on 9/11, and was officially released 
less than three weeks later, on September 30, 2001. 
10 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis and 
Transformation (Washington, D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2002), 1. 
8 
distinction lies in the emphasis placed upon the first two elements of the definition, 
namely, uncertainty and the wide range of challenges.  The reasons for these new 
emphases are described below. 
1. From Relative Certainty To Uncertainty 
Defense planning during and immediately following the Cold War focused 
primarily on the few worst-case scenarios that could be directed at us by more-or-less 
symmetric adversaries.  The prevailing view was that as long as our plans and capabilities 
were sufficient to defend against those worst-case threats or scenarios, then we could 
have a reasonable level of assurance that our capabilities would be adequate protection 
against lesser threats, even if those threats had not been envisioned by the planners. 
The Cold War, Soviet-centric threat was risk-averse and had no interest in putting 
the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to the test.  We understood the Soviet 
Union and its plans for war reasonably well; well enough, at least, to have a reasonable 
expectation of getting some measure of warning of an impending attack.  The terrorist 
threat, according to Paul K. Davis, is much worse.  “Although the forces involved are 
small, they are in nearly all other respects more troublesome: They have positive 
incentives (even if bizarre by our reasoning) to use WMD, their tactics are unpredictable, 
and so on.”11 
2. From Relatively Limited, To Virtually Unlimited, Challenges  
In the above quotation, Davis described the terrorists as having and using 
unpredictable incentives and tactics, even to the point of desiring to use weapons of mass 
destruction.  On September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense forces 
were prepared for an invasion by foreign combat aircraft, but those forces were not 
prepared for a tactic as unpredictable as using domestic, commercial airliners as guided 
missiles.  Terrorist leaders have made no secret about their desire, and their religious 
justifications and clerical authorizations, for using all possible means, including nuclear 
weapons, to destroy those who are not faithful to their radical brand of religion.  Since 
many of those who threaten us are non-state actors, they have very little to lose.  Even 
their own lives are of little value to them, compared to the benefits of paradise which they 
expect to receive as a result of their destructive actions.  This kind of threat opens up an  
                                                 
11 Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, 17-18. 
9 
entirely new and seemingly endless list of potential attack modes for which we must 
prepare and against which we must defend.  The Departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security may not rely simply on defending against one threat group or one scenario. 
As a result of this expansion of the threat, the focus of the Department of Defense 
has now moved into the realm of acquiring capabilities to enable the delivery of “effects” 
according to four standards:12 
• Scale (size, intensity) 
• Temporal aspects (latency, duration, time-phased application) 
• Observability aspects (detection, attribution) 
• Spatial aspects (distance, area) 
This new capabilities-based focus is intended to provide flexibility to address 
known threats as well as those for which no explicit plans have been developed. 
 
C. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? – PART I 
Despite the rapid adoption of CBP in the Departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security, the process is not without its detractors.  One particularly critical paper on the 
subject expressed concern that CBP, at least as it was initially planned for 
implementation by the Bush administration, would disconnect requirements from 
resources and make it very difficult for the military services to know when they have 
succeeded in doing enough. 
Pure capabilities-based planning would be like outfitting a toolbox with 
the latest, most desirable items for supporting the military strategy. But 
how big of a toolbox should you build? How many of each tool do you 
need? How many of these tools need external support in getting to the job 
at hand? How do you judge along the way if you are meeting defense 
objectives if there exists no metric against which to measure progress? 
Planning in such a vacuum does not allow an honest, accurate assessment 
of true military force requirements when no benchmark conflicts are 





                                                 
12 Ryan Henry, "Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review," Parameters 35, 
no. 4 (Winter 2005-06): 12. 
10 
difficult to budget for unknown quantities of capabilities, potentially 
resulting in service rivalries that could easily drive resource requirements 
beyond reach.13  
This author concluded that CBP, more so than older defense planning 
methodologies, is particularly unhelpful in defining how much capability is enough.  
Davis helps to answer this question by pointing out that CBP needs to determine 
not only what needs to be done, but also how quickly it needs to be done.14  Quickness, in 
this case, may be measured either in time or distance; for example, a requirement to halt 
an advancing adversary (the what) within 24 hours or within 50 miles (how quickly).  A 
simple example helps illustrate Davis’ point.  If the healthcare industry in a fictitious 
nation were to use a centralized CBP approach, the planners might wonder how many 
ambulances the country would need.  No one would argue that ambulances were an 
essential capability for the healthcare “toolbox,” but they might argue about how many 
were needed.  In this case, the primary metric for this decision would be the maximum 
number of minutes allowable from the time an ambulance is dispatched until it arrives on 
the scene.  That metric would not be strongly dependent upon any particular scenario, 
other than allowing for normal traffic delays.  A second metric would be an estimate of 
how many ambulances might need to be dispatched simultaneously from a given staging 
point, based upon population density in that particular area.  This metric might be much 
more scenario-dependent, and would have to be carefully thought out based upon 
estimated likelihood of potential mass-casualty incidents such as natural disasters, large 
fires or accidents, or large-scale terrorist attacks.  Defining how quickly effects must be 
delivered helps to answer what kinds of capabilities are needed, and how much of each 
kind.  In other words, the required tempo of “effects delivery” – whether those effects are 
delivered by an ambulance crew or combat air support – helps answer the question of  
how much is enough.  This question will be discussed further in Chapter 6, A Model for 
the Future.  The next chapter will show that establishing and maintaining another kind of 
tempo in the months and years before an attack is just as important to preparedness as is 
the tempo of effects delivery during the response and recovery phases.  
                                                 
13 Jeffrey B. Kendall, Capabilities-Based Planning: The Myth (National Defense University, National 
War College, 2002), 5. 
14 Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, xxii, 32. 
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IV. TEMPO – USING TIME AS A TOOL OF STRATEGY 
This day ordinary Americans took extraordinary steps to help their fellow 
Americans and by doing so gave the greatest sacrifice.15 
 
A. THE MOST IMPORTANT CAPABILITY 
Effective planning for preparedness in today’s threat environment must be treated 
as an essential capability.  In their draft National Preparedness Goal, DHS has stressed 
the importance of planning with these words: “Planning is the foundation on which all 
other capabilities are developed and enhanced, and is essential to their successful 
achievement.”16  Planning for homeland defense and homeland security should be 
thought of as a technological capability that must be developed and kept current.  We 
must never assume that today’s planning technology will be adequate for tomorrow’s 
threats.  
The previous chapter described the shift from threat- and scenario-based planning 
to the capabilities based planning approach now being used by the Departments of 
Defense and Homeland Security.  Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) analysts must 
be mindful of more than just their planning methodology, however.  They also must be 
aware of their planning tempo.  Military planners are familiar with the concepts 
associated with the tempo of combat; concepts which include things such as the intensity 
of combat, the frequency and duration of effects delivery, the rate of resupply – in  
general, the overall intensity and rate at which events unfold during combat.  Combat 
tempo is designed to put the enemy off balance and keep him always in a reactive mode.  
Cold War planners were relatively safe in maintaining a steady and more or less 
symmetric planning tempo on both sides of the conflict.  It was much easier for Cold War 
opponents to keep an eye on each other, knowing that any worrisome upgrade to military 
capabilities would take years to accomplish and would be accompanied by many  
 
                                                 
15 From Angels of Freedom plaque, Flight 93 Crash Site, Shanksville, PA. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, Final Draft of National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, December, 2005), 87. 
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opportunities to discern the opponent’s intentions.  Today’s planners must move beyond 
the outdated notion of a slow-moving and slow-planning adversary if they are to avoid a 
tempo deficit that would give an asymmetric advantage to would-be terrorists. 
 
B. PRELUDE TO ACTION: COLONEL BOYD’S ‘OODA LOOP’ 
Air Force Colonel John Boyd (1937-1997) developed a useful means of looking at 
the cycle of planning and action.  He and his colleagues prepared a diagram that is 
designed to help understand the mental processes of observation, orientation, decision 
and action that fighter pilots unconsciously go through multiple times per second during 
aerial combat.  His Observe – Orient – Decide – Act diagram, or “OODA Loop” is shown 
in Figure 1.  The OODA Loop concept has been applied to processes as diverse as 
combat training and business competition.  The straightforward nature of the Observe – 





Figure 1.   Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop 
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The reason for the popularity and broad application of Colonel Boyd’s idea is not 
merely its somewhat intuitive progression from observation to orientation, decision and 
action, but because of the notion that success is achieved by being able to cycle through 
one’s OODA loop faster and more effectively than one’s adversary or competitor.  
Colonel Boyd believed that if a combatant could observe his adversary’s actions with 
sufficient frequency and clarity, with constant feedback about the adversary’s maneuvers 
and counter-maneuvers, he would begin to get an intuitive sense that would help him 
anticipate his opponent’s next move.  The pilot who could achieve this intuitive sense 
during aerial combat would have an enormous advantage, even if his adversary happened 
to be flying a superior aircraft.  This is not an attempt to achieve some sort of mystical 
clairvoyance, but rather to acquire, gather and understand information at a rate sufficient 
to know how this particular adversary operates.  This idea is sometimes referred to as 
“operating inside the enemy’s (competitor’s) OODA loop.”  Boyd’s biographer wrote 
that understanding this process enables a commander to compress the time between 
observation and action, and to use this advantage to confuse the enemy by acting in an 
unexpected manner.  These two factors – time compression and unexpected action – can 
cause confusion and an inefficient use of time by the adversary.17 
Boyd believed that some kind of OODA Loop advantage accounted for the ten-to-
one kill ratio advantage that American F-86 pilots maintained over their MiG-15 pilot 
counterparts during the Korean war, even though the American pilots had not been 
trained in advanced OODA Loop techniques.  The MiG-15 was an aerodynamically 
superior aircraft, yet Boyd concluded that two characteristics of the F-86 made its 
superior combat performance possible.  First, the design of the F-86 cockpit canopy 
provided a greater field of view than did the MiG-15 canopy.  This canopy gave the 
American pilots more opportunity to accurately observe and orient himself during combat 
maneuvers, and therefore a greater opportunity to decide and act more effectively and 
rapidly so as to confuse and outmaneuver the enemy pilot.  Second, the hydraulic controls  
 
 
                                                 
17 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Company, 2002), 336. 
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in the F-86 allowed the American pilots to maneuver faster and more often than the pilots 
of the MiG-15 who would become fatigued trying to keep up using flight controls that 
took more physical energy to operate. 
This powerful concept of “operating inside the enemy’s OODA loop” is 
applicable to homeland security and counterterrorism planning in at least two ways.  As 
its name implies, the “Observe” function in the OODA loop reveals the necessity of 
maintaining awareness of one’s environment.  In a homeland security setting, this means 
that CIP planners must have a steady stream of detailed information about demonstrated 
terrorist tactics as well as intelligence about possible terrorist plans.  Even if the 
intelligence about the terrorists’ plans is of undetermined credibility, it still provides the 
analyst with an increasing sense of what could happen in the future.  The second way in 
which the OODA loop applies to counterterrorism planning can be seen by observing the 
“Orient” portion of the diagram.  Orientation is the filter through which all facts and 
events are processed.  If a CIP analyst is viewing the unfolding environment through a 
faulty orientation filter that hinders accurate assessments of the threat, then the analyst 
must engage in robust collaboration with others as well as consume a steady stream of 
new information to help overcome that bias.  The more times an analyst can cycle 
through the OODA loop – observing the threat situation, orienting to new information, 
testing biases and theories, reorienting and observing again – the more likely that analyst 
will be able to get an intuitive feel for the way the adversary thinks and plans.  This deep 
understanding of the adversary will help the analyst anticipate innovative attack scenarios 
and then develop the means to defend against those scenarios so as to protect the people 
and places he or she is charged to protect. 
 
C. A TRAGIC ILLUSTRATION 
One of the clearest illustrations of the OODA Loop principle occurred on 
September 11, 2001.  The passengers of each of the four hijacked flights were aware for 
many minutes that their aircraft had been hijacked.  Using the terminology of Boyd’s 
diagram, the passengers had abundant opportunity to observe new information about 
“unfolding circumstances” and were undoubtedly trying to figure out how to properly 
orient themselves and their actions to that information.  In particular, they were using 
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their experience and analysis/synthesis skills (see inside the “Orient” box in Figure 1) to 
help them decide what to do.  Their experience told them that hijackings had always been 
used as a tool to force a government to negotiate with the hijackers, that hijackers were 
not likely to be suicidal, and the passengers would be released after the hijackers were 
reasonably sure their demands would be met.  Our hindsight tells us that on 9/11, 
experience was a faulty guide for knowing what to do during a hijacking.  The hijackers 
reinforced this misunderstanding by telling the passengers that everything would be fine 
if they just complied with orders.  The hijackers were shrewdly exploiting an asymmetric 
advantage of information, and had, in essence, hijacked the passengers’ ability to 
properly orient to what was really happening.  Tragically, the deception was successful 
on three of the hijacked aircraft.  By 9:37 a.m., two planes had crashed into the World 
Trade Center towers and one into the Pentagon.  That is when things began to change on 
United Flight 93, originally bound for San Francisco, but later diverted toward our 
nation’s capitol.  As telephone conversations between Flight 93 passengers and observers 
on the ground began to bring fresh information about unfolding circumstances, the 
passengers were gaining better “visibility” of what was really going on.  This new 
information enabled them to overcome the incorrect biases caused by their accurate 
recollections of previous hijackings.  The passengers’ newly corrected orientation 
allowed them to adjust their decisions and their actions.  They began a counterattack 
against the hijackers in the cockpit at 9:57 a.m., approximately 29 minutes after the 
hijacking began.  The hijackers, realizing they could not make it to their intended 
destination, crashed the plane into an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:02 
a.m.  The passengers’ adjusted orientation and corresponding actions enabled them to 
bravely protect the lives of an unknown number of people who would have died minutes 
later in Washington, D.C. 
Meanwhile, “orientation filters” were being recalibrated at FAA headquarters as 
well.  For more than two years, since August, 1999, the FAA intelligence office had 
thought about the possibility of a suicide hijacking but considered it unlikely.  On this 




The FAA analysts judged [a suicide hijacking] unlikely, because ‘it does 
not offer an opportunity for dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining 
Rahman and other key captive extremists. ... A suicide hijacking is 
assessed to be an option of last resort.’  Analysts could have shed some 
light on what kind of ‘opportunity for dialogue’ al Qaeda desired.  The 
CIA did not write any analytical assessments of possible hijacking 
scenarios.18 
The FAA analysts had assumed, based upon their accurate recollections of past 
hijackings, that any hijacking by terrorists would be for the purpose of negotiation (for 
Sheik Rahman’s release from prison, for example).  If those analysts had been aware of, 
and heeded, the CIA’s intelligence reporting, they would have known that al Qaeda was 
more interested in killing Americans than in negotiating with them.  This fact is painfully 
obvious to us now, but it was less so before 9/11.  A clear understanding of al Qaeda’s 
intentions might have motivated the FAA to increase aviation security as a deterrence 
measure against all hijackings, regardless of the motivation behind the hijackings. 
The testimony of Richard Clarke before the 9/11 Commission reveals why the 
facts that are so obvious to us now were not so obvious before September 11, 2001.  Mr. 
Clarke, the National Counterterrorism Coordinator from 1997 through 2001, told the  
Commission that the warning about the possibility of a suicide hijacking would have 
been just one more speculative theory among many, hard to spot since the volume of 
warnings of “al Qaeda threats and other terrorist threats, was in the tens of thousands – 
probably hundreds of thousands.”19  Mr. Clarke’s statement suggests that too few people 
had access to enough of the facts to enable a process of sorting through the “speculative 
theories” and prioritizing them for actions as simple as hardening cockpit doors. 
The events of 9/11 demonstrate the value of information sharing for CIP analysts; 
specifically the value of sharing information about new tactics being used by terrorists 
and insurgents as well as information about what the terrorists might be thinking about 
doing in the future.  The information must be sufficiently fresh and unprocessed to 
contain the subtleties analysts need if they are to understand and overcome their own  
 
                                                 
18 The 9/11 Commission Report, 345. 
19 The 9/11 Commission Report, 345. 
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biases, continuously test their own theories and adjust them as needed.  Collaboration 
with other CIP analysts and with experts in areas such as intelligence will help identify 
biases and blind spots. 
Homeland security planners are defending against a sophisticated foe.  The daily 
news from Afghanistan and Iraq continues to reveal the insurgent’s effective use of agile 
planning, effective observation, and skilled refinement of tactics.  CIP analysts put 
themselves at a disadvantage when they try to respond to a high-speed, well-informed 
adversary with sluggish planning and outdated presumptions that remain unchallenged.   
Allowing one’s enemy to gain an asymmetric advantage in the areas of information, 
planning and preparedness is to increase the probability of being surprised by – and 
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V. IT TAKES A NETWORK 
Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major 
advantages.20 
 
A. TERRORIST NETWORKS 
The most basic definition of a network is a collection of nodes and links that 
connect pairs of nodes.21  Nodes can be almost anything, from people or computers to 
cities or railway terminals.  The variety of links can be just as diverse, including such 
things as transmission lines, roadways and railroad tracks.   
The radical Islamist terrorist coalition has been described, studied and analyzed as 
a network.  Marc Sageman describes how network analysis can be used to design a 
strategy for dealing with terrorists.  He uses the technical term “scale free network” to 
describe the particular characteristics of the jihadist organization, and then points out the 
strengths, weaknesses and potential strategies associated with this type of network: 
This type of network is robust and resists random attack. Stopping 
terrorists randomly at our borders will not affect its structure. It may stop 
terrorists from coming here, but will leave the network undisturbed. 
However, it is vulnerable to targeted attack, namely against its hubs. If the 
hubs are destroyed, the system breaks down into isolated nodes. The jihad 
will be incapable of mounting sophisticated large scale operations like the 
9/11 attacks and be reduced to small attacks by singletons. It is of course 
possible for such nodes to try to become hubs and create their own little 
networks. Ahmed Ressam tried to recruit new untrained collaborators in 
the Millennial Plot after his original co-conspirators were unable to travel 
to Canada. But such operations have not generally been successful. The 
hubs are vulnerable because most communications go through them. By 
following communications back to them, good police work would be able 
to identify and arrest these human hubs. This strategy has already shown 
considerable success.22 
                                                 
20 John Arquila, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar and Information-Age 
Terrorism," in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. RAND National Defense Research Institute 
(Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1999), 55. 
21 Ted G. Lewis, "Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation" (unpublished manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2004). 
22 From a presentation entitled “Global Salafi Jihad” given by Dr. Marc Sageman to the Department of 
Energy, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX, May 17, 2004. 
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This description of the jihadist network begins to suggest that our strategies to 
defend against it and defeat it require a new kind of thinking and planning. 
 
B. RESILIENCY OF NETWORKS 
Dr. Sageman’s description of the global terrorist network, of which al Qaeda is 
only a small part, indicates that individual terrorists may be removed without seriously 
harming the overall network.  He also points out that scale free networks are vulnerable 
to attacks against their hubs.  Hubs are nodes – people in this case – who are more highly 
connected than most other people in the network.  These nodes represent the terrorist 
leaders.  Sageman suggests that if terrorist leaders are eliminated, this will have the effect 
of breaking the overall network down into a set of smaller subnetworks which would be 
unlikely to have the resources to coordinate and execute major terrorist attacks.  It is 
possible that the Global War on Terrorism led by the United States has had this effect on 
al Qaeda, at least temporarily, and that is why there have been no major attacks against 
our homeland since 9/11.  The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, 
however, that numerous smaller attacks may be sustained in spite of the disruption caused 
by the loss of key terrorist leaders.   
Networks, by nature, are strongly decentralized.  In a twist of irony, al Qaeda’s 
strong commitment to operations security might have harmed their ability to coordinate 
large attacks.  Sageman suggests that al Qaeda’s penchant for security causes them to act 
more like a hierarchy than a network in some ways.  In particular, their tight security 
procedures force them to rely too heavily on their vertical, leader-to-subordinate, 
communication links.  Such heavy dependence upon those links makes them more 
vulnerable to discovery, interception and destruction, and it prevents the extended 
network from having enough links to achieve maximum success in field operations.  In 
fact, Sageman goes so far as to say that the field successes that al Qaeda has achieved 
was largely due to individual terrorists violating their own rules of tradecraft.23  If this is 
true, it would be worth further study to see whether eliminating leadership “hubs” from a 
hybrid hierarchy/network has the unexpected effect of increasing the effectiveness of the 
remaining terrorists by forcing them to operate in a more agile, network-like manner.                                                  
23 Sageman, “Global Salafi Jihad” presentation. 
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C. NETWORK VS. NETWORK 
Network analysts who apply their techniques to the study of terrorist 
organizations often say that it takes a network to fight a network because a hierarchical 
command structure is at a disadvantage when trying to oppose a networked structure.24  
The reason for this is that the nodes (people) in a networked organization are much more 
highly connected to other nodes than are those in a typical hierarchical structure.  Using 
the terminology from Boyd’s OODA diagram in chapter 4, we would say that the people 
in a networked organization have better situational awareness, or more opportunity to 
“observe,” because they have more links from which to gather new information, and the 
information they get is disseminated more rapidly.  They are correspondingly better able 
to “orient” to the new information because of the greater opportunities for collaboration 
and interaction with people with diverse expertise and experience.  All of these features 
give the networked organization the ability to plan, communicate and move resources 
much more quickly than they would if all information and resources were passed to, then 
distributed piecemeal from, a distant centralized command headquarters.  Arquila, et al., 
cite criminal organizations, Colombian drug cartels, persistent religious movements in 
Algeria and the Zapatista movement in Mexico as examples of the ability of relatively 
small networked organizations to continually frustrate the larger hierarchical government 
structures that attempt to suppress or eliminate them.  They suggest that governments 
must adopt the same network design principles as their adversaries, particularly a 
“willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, and by building new 
mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.”25 
 
D. ADVANTAGES OF A NETWORK 
When it comes to planning for preparedness, a networked organization has several 
advantages over a hierarchical, bureaucratic organization.  The following paragraphs 
describe some of those advantage-producing characteristics and why they are useful in 
today’s CIP organizations. 
 
                                                 
24 Lewis, "Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security” 
25 Arquila, et al., Countering the New Terrorism, 55. 
22 
1. Interconnectedness 
Interconnectedness, in this context, is an expression of the need to maximize the 
number of sources of relevant information.  The need for relevance might mean that some 
sources should be discontinued or monitored only infrequently, and that other sources 
should be cultivated.  Interconnectedness is another way of saying “network” except with 
a greater emphasis upon the flow of ideas and information between participants.  
Interconnectedness implies that participants have ready access to much more information 
than that available from just their bosses and immediate co-workers.  This access to 
information is necessary, even if the participants are in a hierarchical organization from a 
chain-of-command perspective.  Interconnectedness is the organizational “highway” 
upon which collaborative interactions may travel.  Without it, collaboration is severely 
weakened, or rendered impossible. 
2. Timeliness Of Information 
It should go without saying, yet we dare not leave it unsaid, that timeliness of 
information is essential to success.  Timeliness of information is an essential 
characteristic for any organization that seeks to “operate inside the enemy’s OODA 
loop.”  For the passengers of Flight 93 on 9/11, a delay of just a few minutes in receiving 
the bias-correcting information about the hijackings and crashes of the other three flights 
would have been too late.  It is true that in the case of intelligence analysis, there is a 
tradeoff between accuracy and timeliness.  The accuracy of an intelligence report might 
increase if the analyst is given more time to assimilate and verify information from 
multiple sources.  Critical infrastructure protection analysts must help intelligence 
analysts know the appropriate balance between accuracy and timeliness.  Miller put it 
well when he said, “Accuracy is a relative term, though. If increasing the accuracy of a 
product causes excessive delays in getting the information to the user, it simply becomes 
highly accurate, but unusable, ‘news.’”26  The 9/11 Commission’s final report showed 
clearly that too much delay in gathering and connecting all the intelligence “dots” turned 
what might have been an opportunity for prevention into a major news event. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Mark E. Miller, The Integration of Operations and Intelligence: Getting Information to the 
Warfighter (Air Command and Staff College, Research Department, 1997), 11, AU/ACSC/0362/97-03. 
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3. Information Sharing Environment 
The 9/11 Commission devoted so much space in their final report to the 
institutionalized withholding of information inside government agencies that the result 
should have been to embarrass governmental institutions into fixing the problem as 
quickly as possible.  But it takes work to make information sharing happen, especially 
when the old model of information ownership fits in so much better with established 
modes of agency and employee recognition.   
The current administration has taken some steps to create a culture of information 
sharing.  For example, through the Executive Order entitled Further Strengthening the 
Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans, the President of the United 
States has ordered federal agencies to enhance information sharing through such actions 
as:27 
• giving the highest priority to, among other things, the interchange of 
terrorism information among agencies (including State, local, tribal and 
private), 
• promptly giving access to the terrorism information to the head of each 
other agency that has counterterrorism functions, 
• cooperating and facilitating production of reports based on terrorism 
information, and 
• preparing terrorism information for maximum distribution (emphasis 
added). 
The President’s direction addresses interconnectedness by including a diverse 
group of agencies (state, local, etc.) and by requiring “maximum distribution” of 
terrorism information.  Such direction from the President of the United States will, over 
time, ease the ability of organizations to establish linkages with other organizations.  This 
was a necessary step of high-level policy, but it is not a sufficient step for ensuring 
adequate information sharing in the near term.  The momentum must be generated and 
sustained through lower level policies and procedures that receive continuous 
encouragement and oversight by the President and Congress. 
                                                 
27 U.S. President.  Executive Order.  “Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to 
Protect Americans.” (27 October 2005).  Available [Online]: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051025-5.html. (accessed February 3, 2006). 
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Other enablers of information withholding are more subtle.  The final report of the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (“WMD Commission”) revealed some surprising ways that information 
sharing can be subconsciously hindered by our rules on classification and handling of 
sensitive information.  For example, some documents are stamped with the caveat, 
ORCON, meaning “originator controlled.”  The WMD Commission said this caveat gives 
the wrong impression that the collectors of intelligence “own” the information and should 
control access to it.  The WMD Commission’s report to the President also cited an 
historical imbalance between protecting sources and methods and the appropriate 
dissemination and sharing of information.  They called for all intelligence information to 
be submitted by the collectors into an “Information Sharing Environment” that would 
balance protection and dissemination.28  These observations by the WMD Commission 
are informative, but they will not, by themselves, generate the necessary changes in 
executive agencies without constant Presidential attention. 
4. Integration vs. Synchronization 
Since 9/11, much has been said about the need to “connect the dots,” referring to 
the need to get all the disparate pieces of intelligence and other information into one 
place where analysts can begin to put them together into an overall picture.  Perhaps the 
dots that are in most need of being connected are the ones within and between the myriad 
governmental organizational charts.  For example, the diverse elements of operations and 
intelligence are often seen as two areas that need to be synchronized for maximum 
effectiveness; that is, intelligence information would be asked for and provided at just the 
right time to support the operation.  But synchronization is not the same as collaboration.  
One can envision the operations expert and the intelligence analyst each staying within 
the bounds of their own organizations and exchanging just enough information for the 
operation to succeed.  Mark Miller says that rather than synchronizing them, “we should 
be making strides to integrate the two disciplines. ... This mentality encourages 
development of a team that will strive to accomplish a common goal.”29  Miller’s 
expression of integration is very close to collaboration.  He continues: 
                                                 
28 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C., 2005), 443-444. 
29 Miller, The Integration of Operations and Intelligence, 2. 
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It is not enough for the intelligence community to improve its support to 
military operations; the operations community must do its part to 
communicate focused requirements that must be satisfied within the 
intelligence cycle. This can only be accomplished by understanding the 
capabilities of the intelligence community as well as the limitations. 
Operators must make a dedicated effort to include their Intel counterparts 
in all aspects of planning and execution and stop the process of using Intel 
to “fill gaps” in the plan. The frequently observed “just tell me what I need 
to know” attitude must disappear. Only then will Ops and Intel be 
integrated into a truly efficient team.30 
Intelligence simply must situate itself within the operational cycle rather 
than outside it. In other words, the intelligence collection, production, and 
dissemination cycle must be compressed so that it fits within the 
operational cycle for targeting to support strike and restrike operations.”31 
Miller promotes integration in his thesis, but the benefits he is describing are the 
fruits of something even greater than integration, and that is collaboration, a subject that 
will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter.  Miller’s promotion of integration 
seems to be based on the assumption that integration necessarily leads to collaboration.  
In the dynamic world of combat operations, this assumption is very likely to be valid.  
Where the pace is markedly more deliberate, however, as it is in strategic planning 
environments, a lack of collaboration would not be as immediately obvious, and 
integration alone might be insufficient.  In homeland security planning environments 
however, a call for integration might lead to the misunderstanding that only two 
organizations are involved (intelligence and operations, for example), and that embedding 
one of them into the other would fix everything.  Homeland security planning involves a 
multitude of organizations at the federal, state and local levels of government, and 
collaboration must be possible even where integration is not possible. 
 
                                                 
30 Miller, The Integration of Operations and Intelligence, 3 
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VI. A MODEL FOR PREPAREDNESS 
Surprise ... includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a 
string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who 
need it.32 
The previous chapters presented the case that the unique nature of today’s threat 
environment must cause CIP organizations to carefully and deliberately design their 
approaches to such things as planning methodology, planning tempo and willingness to 
adopt network-like characteristics.  This chapter will introduce the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommended approach to planning and intelligence collection, and will present the case 
that effective collaboration is needed to pull these other elements together in a coherent 
and effective way.   
 
A. COLLABORATION: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PREPAREDNESS 
The concept of collaboration has been mentioned several times in the preceding 
pages, and this section will expand upon the definition and benefits of collaboration.  
William Pelfrey reports that collaboration has been called “the most essential element in 
the cycle of preparedness.”33  The following example of pre-9/11 interactions at the 
highest level of government will prepare the way for an examination of this bold 
assertion that collaboration is the most essential element in the context of preparedness. 
Just one week before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, National Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, Richard Clarke, wrote a memo to the National Security Advisor in which he 
presented the view that al Qaeda was a nuisance that killed a few Americans every 18 to 
24 months.  Another school of thought viewed al Qaeda as the “point of the spear of 
radical Islam.”  The 9/11 Commission criticized the government for not forcing this 
argument into the open and letting those with diverse opinions enter into a debate on this 
subject.34  Instead, each person or small group held their opinions in a vacuum, and the 
debate about the extent of the al Qaeda threat did not rise to a level that would have                                                  
32 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, viii. 
33 William V. Pelfrey, "The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005): 8. 
34 The 9/11 Commission Report, 343. 
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required further exploration or action.  The 9/11 Commission report goes into further 
detail about the White House meetings and memos on the subject of the threat posed by 
al Qaeda.  Were these people collaborating?  The fact that people are meeting together 
does not necessarily indicate that collaboration is occurring. 
To realize that the word is a combination of “co-“ (meaning with or together) and 
“labor” is to begin to get at the heart of the power of collaboration.  Those who are 
collaborators are not so simply because they have been directed to be in the same room or 
on the same conference call with one another.  Collaboration goes beyond mere physical 
or virtual proximity.  True collaborators are “co-laborers” with each other in practice, not 
just in name.  This idea of laboring together conveys a unity of purpose and an equality of 
rank, at least in the sense of an equal ability to be heard and recognized during debate.  
James Surowiecki’s book, The Wisdom of Crowds, offers several compelling examples of 
the value of collaboration within groups, as well as the tragic consequences that can 
occur when groups merely meet together but fail to collaborate.  The vital element that 
seems to determine whether collaboration is real or imagined is an effective means of 
extracting and aggregating the information of everyone in the group.  Surowiecki claims 
that the intelligence community’s inability or unwillingness to aggregate the information 
and judgments of everyone who could have had some input to the pre-9/11 discussions 
was a vital failure in preventing the 9/11 attacks.35   
1. The Crucible of Collaboration 
If we juxtapose the preceding discussion about collaboration alongside the 
“Orientation” phase of John Boyd’s OODA Loop (Figure 1), we find that this alignment 
highlights one of the greatest benefits of a strongly collaborative environment, and that is 
the opportunity for peers to hold each other accountable for their biases.  Biases are 
inevitable, but they are dangerous when they are unrecognized, denied or unchallenged.  
As new ideas and information are brought into view, biases must be self-challenged and 
group-challenged.  All participants must be willing to discard biases that cannot 
withstand this crucible of collaboration. 
                                                 
35 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 78. 
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One of the greatest hindrances to collaboration within and among government 
agencies is the bureaucratic friction that makes effective collaboration difficult or 
impossible.  Like the energy-draining controls of the MiG-15 aircraft mentioned in 
Chapter 4, bureaucratic friction can drain the energy of those who want to innovate and 
collaborate, but find the friction simply too powerful to overcome.  More often than not, 
bureaucratic friction is assumed to be a necessary evil of government bureaucracies.  The 
nearly universal understanding of the equivalent term, “red tape,” reveals the presumed 
inevitability of such friction.  A close examination of each bit of friction-producing red 
tape reveals the almost universally benevolent rationale that, perhaps generations ago, 
intended to provide protection against wasteful spending or violations of civil rights.  
Without tearing down essential protections, CIP and intelligence organizations must 
remove all hindrances to effective information sharing and collaboration.  Any attempt to 
protect the homeland without demanding and ensuring effective collaboration within and 
among all appropriate agencies is to guarantee our unpreparedness for future attacks.  It is 
with good reason that collaboration – actual co-laboring – has been described as the most 
essential element in the cycle of preparedness. 
 
B. WHERE THERE IS NO VISION, THE PEOPLE PERISH36 
There must be something deep within the human heart that ensures our immunity 
and reflexive resistance to being ordered to do the very things we most need to do to 
survive.  For example, statistics and our own casual observations reveal just how 
effective are the frequent exhortations for us as a nation to eat properly and exercise 
regularly.  Similarly, a mandate for something as important as collaboration within the 
homeland security community might cause meetings to happen and money to be spent, 
but it will not result in real collaboration, at least not as it is described in these pages.  To 
try to force collaboration rather than engendering a vision for it is to harden the victims of 
the mandate against the very idea, evoking the familiar bureaucratic mantra that 
“someday, this too shall pass.”  Recognizing this aspect of human nature is the first step 
in addressing the problem.  Collaboration should be treated as a vision that must be 
caught.  We must be imaginative in creating the need and desire for collaboration. 
                                                 
36 Proverbs 29:18 (King James Version) 
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The 9/11 Commission wrote that even before 9/11 various government agencies 
had considered the idea of terrorists using hijacked aircraft as guided missiles, but each 
one discarded it from further consideration.  The Commission added, “The challenge was 
to flesh out and test those scenarios, then figure out a way to turn a scenario into 
constructive action.”37  The notion of “fleshing out and testing scenarios” begs for a 
collaborative planning environment.  The idea of establishing such an environment, and 
using it in the manner recommended in the literature developed in the years following 
Pearl Harbor, seems to be the crucial piece that was missing from pre-9/11 
counterterrorism planning.  It is imperative that every person responsible for 
counterterrorism – whether elected official, head of an agency or entry-level analyst – 
must catch this part of the 9/11 Commission’s vision and push it forward as fast and as 
far as possible.  The remainder of this chapter is designed to present the details of the 
9/11 Commission’s strategy and combine it with the elements from the preceding 
chapters (planning methodology, planning tempo, and the characteristics of networks, 
including collaboration) to provide a framework for CIP planners to advance the 
effectiveness of their own processes. 
1. The Intelligence Cycle 
The process by which the consumers of intelligence information submit their 
requests for new information, and how that information is collected, processed and 
disseminated is referred to as The Intelligence Cycle.  One way of illustrating this process 
is shown in Figure 2, below. 
As with so many other concepts in the field of protection planning, the metaphor 
of a cycle is useful.  A cyclical process implies that there is no final end state; that the job 
is never finished completely.  In fact, when it comes to preparedness planning, going 
through the cycle effectively is the job.  The goal is to expand the two-dimensional cycle 
into a three-dimensional spiral, where the third dimension represents increasing 
effectiveness.  A spiral shows continuous improvement, whereas a cycle that is confined 
to two dimensions represents going in circles, always doing the same thing, with hardly a 
thought about how to make things better. 
                                                 




Figure 2.   Typical Presentation of the Intelligence Cycle 
 
Intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal knows from firsthand experience that the 
level of communication between collector and consumer implied by the diagram of the 
intelligence cycle is often not an accurate reflection of the real situation.38  The 
intelligence community often produces new reports based upon old requests and 
entrenched reporting patterns, even when no one is asking for the specific information 
contained in the latest reports.  This is an example of going in circles, rather ascending 
the spiral of increasingly effective tasking, collection and reporting. The intelligence 
community needs feedback from the consumers of the intelligence information so that 
collection and processing resources may be directed to the areas where they are most 
needed. 
2. The Essential Vision 
The 9/11 Commission had much to say about the process of intelligence 
collection tasking and reporting.  In its final report, the Commission described the 
intelligence community’s significant effort to study the phenomenon of surprise attack 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  The various reports that emerged from this 
                                                 
38 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 50-
51. 
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research presented recommendations in a variety of ways, but the 9/11 Commission 
observed that they tended to have four elements in common.  The Commission also 
asserted that if the intelligence community had tried to implement these four steps, the 
attacks of 9/11 might have been avoided.  The four elements, as they were presented in 
the 9/11 Commission’s final report, are:39  
1. Think about how surprise attacks might be launched. 
2. Identify telltale indicators connected to the most dangerous possibilities. 
3. Where feasible, collect intelligence on these indicators. 
4. Adopt defenses to deflect the most dangerous possibilities or at least 
trigger an earlier warning. 
A cursory examination of these elements reveals that the third step is the entry 
point into the traditional intelligence cycle shown in Figure 2.  The first two steps, 
therefore, should be directed by the consumer to focus intelligence collection to look for 
potential attack preparations.  In other words, the consumer should not be merely a 
passive observer of the stream of reports that come from the intelligence community, but 
must be an active participant in directing the collection of new intelligence. 
The only problem with the Commission’s four step planning protocol is that its 
potential benefit can be neutralized by attempting to implement it in a hierarchical, stove-
piped fashion rather than in a collaborative, networked fashion.  Each step should be 
implemented in a highly collaborative environment using a group of people with a broad 
range of expertise and backgrounds. 
3. Step 1:  “Think About How Surprise Attacks Might Be Launched” 
Security experts come face-to-face with a dilemma when they contemplate this 
component of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to institutionalize imagination.  It 
is easy to believe that using imagination to come up with scenarios can contribute more 
to the problem than to the solution, because unbridled imagination can produce a limitless 
supply of scenarios which exploit the vulnerabilities in countless targets.  There is no end 
to the number of potential scenarios.  Many of them seem credible, yet the nation’s entire 
gross domestic product would not be sufficient to eliminate all of them from the realm of 
possibility.  How is it possible to reconcile the tension between failure of imagination at 
                                                 
39 The 9/11 Commission Report, 346. 
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one extreme, and the paralysis created by too much imagination at the other extreme?  
Clearly, what is needed is not unbridled imagination, but educated imagination.   
Once again, collaboration provides the means to deal with the abundant “fruits” of 
imagination.  Intelligence analysts might not be organizationally embedded into the 
offices of CIP or Vulnerability Assessment analysts, but the two groups should be so 
tightly integrated in practice that they each benefit from frequent and dynamic 
collaboration with each other.  As each begins to develop a deep understanding of the 
needs and capabilities of the other, they can begin to agree on which scenarios are most 
likely to occur, and which would have the highest consequences.  Even if this 
collaboration does not result in eliminating multitudes of scenarios from the list of 
possibilities, it can at least provide a way to prioritize them so that intelligence collection 
and resources may be directed against the most likely scenarios. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created an innovative approach to 
thinking about how surprise attacks might be launched.  DHS formed a team called the 
Analytic Red Cell with the stated goal of “promoting imaginative thinking about threats, 
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures.”40  This group challenges prevailing views and 
assumptions and tries to “get inside” the mind of an adversary in an effort to anticipate 
adversary planning.  Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the Analytic Red Cell 
Program is not its goals, but its use of collaboration as the central element to accomplish 
those goals.  The core staff of federal and contractor employees is supplemented by 
“hundreds of experts, creative thinkers, and individuals from around the country and 
world, including academics, psychologists, scientists, novelists, screenwriters, military 
war-gamers, special operations forces, cyber experts, think tanks, and industry 
specialists.”41  Using individuals with such diverse backgrounds (and even nationalities) 
maximizes opportunities for “getting inside the adversary’s mind” for the purpose of 
anticipating attack modes.   
 
                                                 
40 From an undated DHS information sheet on the Analytic Red Cell Program. 
41 Ibid. 
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Naysayers might argue that exercises such as this would generate better novels 
than realistic attack scenarios.  That might be true, but during this initial stage, it is 
important to get all ideas out in the open and begin to categorize them in various ways.  
There will be opportunities in later steps to prioritize the scenarios based upon an 
estimate of the probability of likelihood of each scenario or category.  It is also important 
to realize that during this early phase of the planning process, it is not necessary to 
divulge potential vulnerability information to participants who do not have the 
appropriate security clearances. 
4. Step 2:  “Identify Telltale Indicators Connected to the Most 
Dangerous Possibilities” 
The Department of Homeland Security has provided the homeland security 
community with a variety of capabilities-based planning tools, including the National 
Planning Scenarios, the Universal Task List and the Target Capabilities List.  The 
National Planning Scenarios give parameters for a variety of natural and man-made 
disasters so that analysts will have a place to begin their preparedness planning.  The 
Universal Task List (UTL) is a reference menu of tasks which public and private 
organizations must cooperatively achieve in order to address major events.  The Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) describes the capabilities that will be needed to perform some of 
the most critical tasks in the UTL.  As they deal with scenarios, tasks and capabilities to 
prepare for disasters, homeland security planners should realize that potential adversaries 
must go through a similar process in order to create a disaster.  This fact is the basis for 
the second step in the 9/11 Commission’s process, that of identifying telltale indicators 
connected to the most dangerous possibilities.  In essence, this step is a matter of 
determining the adversary’s UTL and TCL for each scenario.  The 9/11 hijacker’s need 
for training on how to fly large commercial airliners is an example of a target capability 
that, had it been identified soon enough, could have led to a greater opportunity to 
“connect the dots” of information that had already been gathered before the attacks 
occurred. 
Looking for telltale indicators might mean using old sources of information in 
new ways.  For example, one of the tasks that terrorists must perform well if they are to 
be successful is to maintain public support in their home countries.  Public support is 
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needed to fund their operations and to minimize interference from law enforcement.  This 
task (one element of the terrorist’s UTL) depends, in turn, upon the terrorist’s capabilities 
(from their TCL) for using the media to communicate their message.  One of the telltale 
indicators that the intelligence community should monitor is the shift in rhetoric and 
metaphor used by the media in Islamic countries to shape public opinion about the United 
States, its allies, and their operations.  George Lakoff describes how the use of metaphor 
was used by the White House to prepare the United States for the first Gulf War in 1991.  
Lakoff argues that even if the U.S. had not been so clear in stating its intentions over a 
period of many months, Saddam Hussein should have known an attack was coming 
because of the government’s use of strong metaphorical language.42  This technique 
might provide useful telltale indicators that terrorists are attempting to build support for 
new attacks. 
As with all other parts of the planning process, “looking for telltale indicators” 
cannot be successfully accomplished in a vacuum.  Analysts need a continuous stream of 
information on the latest tactics being used by terrorists.  The data needs to be sufficiently 
detailed and unprocessed to allow an analysis of the trajectory of technological and 
tactical developments.  If current collection and reporting methods do not include this 
level of detail, a field analyst in any agency should be allowed to present a case for 
asking the intelligence collectors to modify their collection, analysis and reporting of 
post-event data.  If analysts are able to synthesize a postulated trajectory of enemy 
tactical development, this could be used to assess and adjust the protection of critical 
infrastructure elements, predict future developments, and possibly even generate new and 
better intelligence tasking to look for additional precursors. 
Once again, collaboration is an essential element for success in this part of the 
process as well.  In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, the acting director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency stated, “Information considered irrelevant noise by one set  
 
 
                                                 
42 George Lakoff, "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf," speech 
delivered to Audience at Alumni House, January 30, 1990, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, 
CA, http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html. 
(accessed February 4, 2006). 
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of analysts may provide critical clues or reveal significant relationships when subjected to 
analytic scrutiny by another.”43  This is a strong argument both for collaboration and 
information sharing.  
5. Step 3.  “Where Feasible, Collect Intelligence on These Indicators” 
The two previous steps provide the foundation for entry into the traditional 
intelligence cycle.  That is, they create the ability to focus intelligence collection requests 
to generate actionable information, and to improve future collection requests.  Returning 
to John Boyd’s OODA Loop analogy, the CIP and intelligence analysts must be able to 
receive new and relevant information in a timely manner (“observe”), assess the meaning 
of this new information in collaboration with others (“orient”), and then decide what new 
information or action is needed to broaden the understanding of the adversary.  If this 
OODA Loop process can be operated efficiently and in a timely fashion, the analyst 
teams have a much better chance of asking for the right “dots” and then connecting them 
in a way that allows for the most relevant use of protection resources and which 
maximizes the potential for disrupting attacks in the planning or early execution stages. 
The 9/11 Commission described this stage in the process as getting the 
intelligence system “tuned to comprehend the potential significance” of the information it 
is collecting.44  The Commission cited as negative examples the July 2001 FBI report 
about potential terrorist interest in aircraft training, and the August 2001 arrest of 
Zacarias Moussaoui after he behaved suspiciously in flight school.  Since the national 
intelligence community had not collaborated to think of possible scenarios and generate 
lists of tasks and capabilities needed by the adversaries to accomplish the scenarios, the 
intelligence system had not been “tuned” to understand the significance of this 
information about strange behavior in flight schools. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), tested a remarkable 
program that performed the first three steps of this planning protocol.  DARPA’s 
approach sounds somewhat like datamining, but with a fundamental difference.  
Datamining is an unguided scan of large amounts of data to find patterns that look 
                                                 
43 Testimony of RADM Lowell E. Jacoby, 9/11 Commission hearings, “Information Sharing on 
Terrorism-Related Data.”  1 October 2002.  Available [online]: http://9-
11congress.netfirms.com/Jacoby.html.  (accessed February 5, 2006). 
44 The 9/11 Commission Report, 347. 
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suspicious.  Because datamining’s success depends upon having a huge quantity and 
diversity of information upon which to operate, privacy advocates have expressed 
concerns about the loss of civil liberties that datamining could cause.  DARPA’s 
approach on the other hand, used the first two steps of the 9/11 planning protocol to 
implement the third step.  That is, the DARPA method resulted in a very targeted scan of 
databases to look for evidence that certain scenario-dependent tasks and capabilities were 
being pursued by would-be terrorists.  Dr. Tony Tether, Director of DARPA, described 
this program to Congress in the following manner: 
Our approach starts with developing attack scenarios, which are used to 
find specific patterns that could indicate terrorist plans or planning.  These 
scenarios would be based on expert knowledge from previous terrorist 
attacks, intelligence analysis, new information about terrorist techniques, 
and/or from wargames in which clever people imagine ways to attack the 
United States and its deployed forces.  The basic approach does not rely 
on statistical analysis to discover unknown patterns for creating predictive 
models.  Instead, we start with expert knowledge to create scenarios in 
support of intelligence analysis versus a data mining approach that scans 
databases for previously unknown correlations. 
The scenarios would then be reduced to a series of questions about which 
data would provide evidence that such attacks were being planned.  We 
call these scenarios “models,” and they are, essentially, hypotheses about 
terrorist plans.  Our goal is to detect data that supports the hypotheses.45 
 
DARPA’s imaginative attempt to implement the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations unfortunately was derailed by Congressional action after pressure from 
a vocal minority overruled the technical and privacy merits of the program.  This 
Congressional action might very well have further solidified the institutional inertia that 
suppresses imagination in government bureaucracies and makes innovators either look 
outside government for employment or decide that the safest career path is to avoid being 
imaginative.  Success in the task of preparedness might very well depend upon future 
Congressional encouragement of these kinds of innovative programs, rather than their 
elimination. 
                                                 
45 Testimony by Dr. Tony Tether, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in 
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census held in 
Washington, D.C., May 6, 2003, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C. , 2003). 
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6. Step 4.  “Adopt Defenses to Deflect the Most Dangerous Possibilities 
or at Least Trigger an Earlier Warning” 
This final step of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation occurs after the first 
three steps have successfully returned data which indicates that a particular method of 
attack is of concern.  Danger, or risk, involves a mixture of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences.  Proper interpretation of these variables may be known only within the 
context of an integrated, collaborative environment.  To try to accomplish this step in a 
vacuum is to invite poor prioritization, over-spending to defend against less urgent threats 
and under-spending to defend against more urgent ones. 
 
C. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? – PART II 
Defenses cannot achieve perfect safety.  They make targets harder to 
attack successfully, and they deter attacks by making capture more likely.  
Just increasing the attacker’s odds of failure may make the difference 
between a plan attempted, or a plan discarded.  The enemy also may have 
to develop more elaborate plans, thereby increasing the danger of 
exposure or defeat.46 
The first step in the 9/11 Commission’s planning protocol is to generate potential 
attack scenarios.  Scenario planning teams should seek law enforcement and intelligence 
community input whenever possible.  For each scenario, the planning team should 
estimate the number of terrorist cells, and the size of each cell, that would be needed to 
accomplish the attack.  Law enforcement personnel should be asked for their professional 
judgment as to the probability that the terrorist cell(s) would be detected by law 
enforcement or other means during any stage of planning, reconnaissance or preparation 
before the attack.  Planners should ask themselves and their law enforcement counterparts 
how hardened a target would have to be to force the adversary into the realm of 
detectability by law enforcement.  The kind of hardening that would increase the 
probability of detection before the attack consists of techniques or procedures that cause 
one or more of the following effects for the adversary: 
• Increase the amount of surveillance needed to plan the attack 
• Increase the amount of equipment needed to carry out the attack 
• Increase the number of attackers needed to carry out the attack 
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• Increase the amount of coordination needed to plan and carry out the 
attack 
• Increase the amount of time the attackers need to carry out the attack 
• Increase the complexity of the attack so as to decrease the probability of 
its success 
• Decrease the likelihood that an attack would even be attempted, because 
of the low probability the attacker would achieve the desired consequences 
Fixed spacing on bullets - .5 from left margin and 6 pt after  
As a hypothetical example, suppose that one attack scenario against an 
unhardened target would require a cell of five terrorists to conduct the planning and 
operations.  Law enforcement experts might determine that they would detect a cell of 
five terrorists planning and conducting these operations with a probability of only 15%.  
But if the target could be hardened to a certain degree, analysts might estimate that it 
would now require ten terrorists to accomplish the same attack, and that they would have 
to purchase and learn how to use some equipment that is relatively uncommon.  Law 
enforcement experts might decide their probability of detecting this attack in the planning 
or early execution stages would jump to 60%.  In such a case, the protection planners 
might determine that this amount of hardening would be sufficient according to their risk 
management approach.  A collaborative approach such as this not only helps design cost-
effective hardening measures, it helps “tune the system” to detect preparations in advance 
by getting law enforcement officials involved in the planning stages. 
 
D. WARNING 
Our nation has had too many opportunities to witness the damage that can be 
caused by a traitorous spy, someone the security community refers to as an “insider.”  
The damage caused by an insider can be great, even when information is heavily 
compartmented and very few people have access to the “big picture.”  The potential 
Achilles’ Heel of enhanced information sharing and collaboration is the malevolent 
insider.  As we move toward an environment where much more sensitive strategic and 
tactical information is distributed to thousands of people in many parts of the 
government, this increases the likelihood of an insider getting the information and it 
dramatically increases the amount of damage that one malevolent insider can cause.  
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Despite their ponderous inertia, our governmental institutions are moving inexorably into 
a more networked, collaborative era, and our insider protection and detection 
technologies must not be allowed to fall behind.  To proceed in an unbalanced fashion 
toward a more networked, but inadequately protected, environment is to forfeit to every 
potential adversary the ultimate asymmetric tool with which to destroy us – our most 
sensitive critical infrastructure protection information.  The very information that has the 








VII. APPLICATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY47 
Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake ... of forgetting that a fine 
deterrent can make a superb target.48 
 
A. THE MISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is charged with building and 
maintaining the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.49  The DOE’s protection planning 
process for its nuclear facilities has evolved over many years and is neither derived from 
nor driven by homeland security policy.  Instead, the policy requirements for the 
protection of these facilities is found in the Atomic Energy Act, the Code of Federal 
Regulations and internal DOE directives.  Even so, the principles from the previous 
chapters are so broadly applicable that they will be used to show areas where DOE could 
improve its processes. 
 
B. UNIQUE FACILITIES – “WEAPONS IN PLACE” 
The DOE’s nuclear weapons work is carried out at several government-owned, 
contractor-operated facilities, as shown in Figure 3.  These facilities are critical to 
national security, not only because of the vital role they play in maintaining our nuclear 
deterrence capability, but also because the information and materials they protect would 
be so dangerous if they were to get into the wrong hands.  Homeland Security secretary 
Michael Chertoff’s description of certain facilities as “weapons in place” would certainly 
apply to DOE’s nuclear facilities.50  “Weapons in place” is a phrase Mr. Chertoff used to  
 
 
                                                 
47 The author uses several lengthy quotations from official, open source, government statements in this 
chapter as a means of ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is inadvertently included. 
48 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, viii. 
49 DOE accomplishes this through the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration 
whose Administrator reports to the Secretary of Energy.  Unless there is a need to distinguish between the 
roles of the two organizations in this thesis, the two will be referred to collectively as DOE. 
50 Testimony of Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security. Senate,  Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee.  14 July 2005.  Available [online]: 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4631/ (accessed February 3, 2006). 
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describe facilities in which a terrorist could find enough chemicals, biological agents or 
nuclear materials to make a weapon of mass destruction without having to bring those 
materials from the outside.   
 
 
Figure 3.   DOE Sites Containing Special Nuclear Materials 
Source: http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/2005nuclear/NukeX.pdf 
 
The Government Accountability Office acknowledged the unique nature of these 
facilities when they wrote, “DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on 
a site containing the material used in nuclear weapons—called special nuclear material—
could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. This 
is particularly true at sites that contain Category I special nuclear material, which consists 
of specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the form of 
assembled nuclear weapons and test devices, major nuclear components, and other high-
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grade materials such as solutions and oxides.”51  A successful attack against one of these 
facilities could damage the ability to maintain the necessary level of our nation’s nuclear 
deterrence, cause serious health and environmental consequences within and beyond the 
boundary of the site, and provide materials terrorists would need to make multiple 
weapons of mass destruction which could then be used at multiple locations.  These 
unique characteristics provide the justification for hardening these facilities to an 
extraordinarily high degree. 
 
C. PLANNING FOR DOE’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
DOE’s security analysis, planning and protection system could be diagrammed in 
many ways depending upon which element(s) are being emphasized.  Figure 4 puts the 
vulnerability assessment (VA) analyst at the center of the diagram.   
 
 
Figure 4.   DOE Protection Planning and Testing Diagram 
 
                                                 
51 Testimony of Robin M. Nazzaro, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform.  
"Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet 
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The term “analyst” in this case may refer to a team of analysts or to anyone who 
is involved in the planning and analysis process.  These VA analysts are DOE’s 
equivalent to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) analysts in the field of homeland 
security.  The Protection Strategy and Posture, shown in the upper right corner of the 
diagram, is the output of the entire process and is where planning meets reality.  The 
Protection Strategy and Posture is the reason for the existence of the entire planning 
system and includes everything from the number of protective forces and their weaponry, 
deployment, tactics and training, to the hardware, software, processes and personnel who 
protect the valuable information and assets at these facilities.  Figure 4 reveals a variety 
of “inputs” from which the analyst must draw, as well as the “outputs,” or work products 
the analyst must produce.  The “Target Identification and Characterization” block 
represents all of the valuable assets at the facility that might be potential terrorist targets.  
The “Situational Awareness” block represents the analysts’ existing knowledge, based 
upon training, education and life experiences, as well as sources of fresh information, all 
of which help the analyst orient properly to the threat environment.  Most of the VA 
analyst’s new situational awareness information comes from open sources, although there 
is no supplier of such information that develops information products specifically with 
the needs of VA analysts in mind.  At very infrequent intervals, typically two to four 
times per year, classified intelligence briefings are presented by DOE Headquarters to its 
field sites via secure teleconference.  These briefings, although classified, are heavily 
sanitized to remove any information about sources and methods, and seem to be designed 
to help the diverse audience get an overall sense of what is happening in the threat 
environment rather than to provide details on past terrorist attacks or details about the 
terrorists’ plans as described in captured materials or through interviews with detainees.  
Of particular importance for the purpose of this thesis is the left hand side of 
Figure 4.  The agencies which make up the Intelligence Community, shown at the top, 
draw from the available stream of intelligence information and produce databases of 
information as well as finished reports.  One such report is the Defense Intelligence 
Agency’s classified Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapons Facilities and Other 
Selected Strategic Facilities, usually referred to as the Postulated Threat Statement.  The 
Postulated Threat Statement provides threat information about postulated adversary team 
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sizes, characteristics, capabilities and applicability to national security assets. The 
Postulated Threat Statement is based on intelligence information detailing actual terrorist 
attacks and the equipment and tactics utilized in the attacks, expert judgments regarding 
stated terrorist intentions and the ability of the terrorist to execute the stated objectives, 
and postulated capabilities based on the latest knowledge concerning terrorist activities.52 
Department of Energy headquarters uses the Postulated Threat Statement to 
develop two DOE-specific documents: the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and the 
Adversaries Capabilities List (ACL).  These two classified documents define the numbers 
and types of adversaries against which the site must be prepared to defend, as well as 
capabilities such as training and equipment which those adversaries might be expected to 
have and use.53  (CIP analysts might want to think of the DBT and ACL as being roughly 
equivalent to an adversary’s version of a Target Capabilities List.)  As mentioned earlier, 
the protection posture consists of the security forces, procedures and systems which are 
used protect against a wide array of possible attacks, including cyber attacks and 
malevolent “insiders.”  The DBT and ACL are derived from intelligence information, but 
their purpose is not to provide intelligence information.  Rather, they serve as the 
performance specification against which each DOE facility must design and test its 
protection strategy and posture.  The post-9/11 DBTs have set a very challenging 
standard of protection, or hardening, for all DOE nuclear facilities, and the amount of 
hardening required is graded according to the particular types and quantities of materials 
at a given site.  “The 2003 DBT assumes that terrorist groups are the following: well 
armed and equipped; trained in paramilitary and guerrilla warfare skills and small unit 
tactics; highly motivated; willing to kill, risk death, or commit suicide; and capable of 
attacking without warning. Furthermore, according to the 2003 DBT, terrorists might 
attack a DOE facility for a variety of goals, including the theft of a nuclear weapon, 
nuclear test device, or special nuclear material; radiological, chemical, or biological  
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sabotage; and the on-site detonation of a nuclear weapon, nuclear test device, or special 
nuclear material that results in a significant nuclear yield. DOE refers to such a 
detonation as an improvised nuclear device.”54 
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the most recently published Postulated Threat 
Statement was issued in 1994 and was intended to be used for ten years.55  After the 9/11 
attacks, updates to the Postulated Threat Statement and the DBT continued in parallel as 
much as possible.  The new Postulated Threat Statement was issued in January, 2003 and 
the DBT followed on May 20, 2003.  This planning tempo is analogous to that of the 
DoD’s during the Cold War, when the presumed adversaries were nations whose 
planning tempos were roughly equivalent.  DOE has hastened the pace of planning and 
was able to issue the two most recent DBT updates within a period of 19 months.  Even 
so, due to the slow federal budget process and the number of years it takes to get physical 
upgrades approved, designed and constructed, much work has to be done within DOE 
just to comply with the DBT that was issued in 2003 in reaction to the attacks of 9/11. 
Once a site’s protection posture is defined and put into place, DOE maintains an 
ongoing process, shown in Figure 4, of developing attack scenarios, designing 
performance tests, analyzing potential upgrades and justifying additional resources to 
support those upgrades. 
 
D. INFORMATION CONTAINMENT   
That same figure reveals, however, that the daily stream of intelligence 
information does not make its way to the VA analyst in the field.  The analyst might have 
some very general unclassified open source material with which to enhance his or her 
situational awareness and provide new data to spark imaginative scenario development, 
but there is no formal mechanism which requires that all VA analysts be provided the 
most highly classified and up-to-date intelligence information.  Some might argue that 
such access is not necessary since the DBT was derived from intelligence information.  
                                                 
54 Testimony of Robin M. Nazzaro, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform.  
"Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet 
the May 2003 Design Basis Threat." 22 June 2004. 
55 Testimony of Joseph S. Mahaley, US Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform.  24 
June 2003.  Available [online]: http://www.energy.gov/print/2343.htm. (accessed January 16, 2006). 
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But the DBT itself is two steps removed from the actual intelligence information, and is, 
in fact, a design specification rather than an intelligence report.  Furthermore, its update 
frequency is measured in years rather than days – perhaps appropriate given its purpose 
as a design specification – but the DBT is insufficient to meet analysts’ needs in today’s 
threat environment.  The significance of this information gap is apparent when one 
realizes that a similar isolation of analysts from pertinent intelligence information 
resulted in a tragic failure of analysis and action within the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) before 9/11, as described in Chapter  IV. 
 
E. COLLABORATION 
The limitation mentioned above is only one symptom of a larger issue, and that is 
the lack of representation of field perspective in the processes of intelligence collection 
and distribution as well as in the preparation of the Postulated Threat Statement and the 
DBT/ACL.  Figure 4 reveals that the overall flow of information that is derived from 
classified intelligence is for the most part, unidirectional.  There is no formal structure to 
ensure that field analysts provide feedback to, or request information from, the 
intelligence community.  This isolation means that there is no structured mechanism to 
promote robust collaboration between DOE VA analysts and intelligence analysts, and 
therefore, no way to involve the VA analysts in the intelligence cycle recommended by 
the 9/11 Commission and described in Chapter VI.  The purpose of establishing this 
relationship is not to fulfill any optimistic notion that it would lead to advance warning of 
the date and time of an impending attack.  The characterization of the low-signature 
threat in Chapter 2 should be sufficient to inform us that the advance notice of an attack 
would be extremely unlikely and should not be counted upon.  Instead, the interaction 
between the VA and intelligence analysts would serve the following two-fold purpose: 
• Establish a collaborative environment for scenario development and 
intelligence tasking to enable all parties to gain a better understanding of 
the intelligence collection needs, possibilities and limitations. 
• Provide a steady flow of information related to the terrorist tactics being 
used throughout the world, but especially in the dynamic environments of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the terrorists are constantly refining their 
operational and tactical techniques to overcome new counter-insurgency 
initiatives of coalition forces.  Such detailed information might very well 
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contain subtleties that could have significance only to a field VA analyst 
who could immediately put the information to use. 
 
A simple modification to the previous diagram shows the recommended 
connections that would cultivate the benefits of information sharing and collaboration.  
The changes indicated by the red arrows in Figure 5 would allow the VA analysts in the 
field to get relatively unfiltered information about current and potential terrorist tactics at 
the same time that headquarters receives that information.  This modification would 
move toward a more networked environment with better timeliness of information. 
 
 









F. INCREASING THREAT 
One additional reason that such interaction between the VA and intelligence 
analysts is crucial is that post-9/11 versions of the DBT “significantly increased” the size 
of the adversary force that must be successfully countered.56  The significance of this fact 
is that the number and complexity of possible attack scenarios, and therefore the 
challenge of defending against those scenarios, increases exponentially as the adversary 
numbers and capabilities increase.  A strong, collaborative atmosphere is therefore 
essential to generate and assess the myriad new attack scenarios that would not have been 
possible with the smaller attacking force described in previous DBTs. 
Before 9/11, when the number of adversaries against which DOE sites had to 
defend was significantly lower and the complexity of potential attack scenarios was less 
challenging, it is quite possible that the infrequently updated Postulated Threat 
Statements, DBTs and ACLs provided adequate information for the VA analysts.  With 
the dramatic post-9/11 increases in both the DBT and ACL however, the VA analysts 
need all the information they can get to help them think of new attack scenarios.  The 
purpose is not to exceed the bounds set by the DBT and ACL, but to be able to think of 
the vastly greater number of challenging scenarios that fall within DBT parameters, and 
to design protection measures that would defend against many, rather than just one or a 
few, attack modes. 
Security managers at DOE headquarters would be justifiably concerned at this 
suggestion, thinking that the analyst’s imaginations might run wild with too much new 
information.  But the interaction between the VA and intelligence analysts would provide 
strong justification for ensuring that “wild” scenarios were documented and removed 
from further consideration, thereby eliminating the possibility of spending resources 
unwisely.  The synergy that could be developed between the two groups of analysts could 
conceivably help identify relatively inexpensive modifications to current procedures or 
structures (analogous to hardened cockpit doors) that would help reduce vulnerabilities to 
scenarios that might not have been thought of otherwise. 
                                                 
56 Testimony of Glenn S. Podonsky, US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations.  “Readiness of Department of Energy Protective Forces.”  
26 July 2005. 
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Finally, intelligence reports can contain information that might never find its way 
into a design specification such as the DBT/ACL, but which would be very important for 
a field analyst to know.  Referring back to Colonel Boyd’s OODA diagram in Chapter 4, 
each analyst’s orientation mechanism causes them to see information in unique ways.  
The intelligence collector outside of DOE, the DOE intelligence analyst and the DOE 
field analyst each might gain something different from the same intelligence report.  An 
element of data that might seem insignificant to one could be of tremendous significance 
to another.  A subtle change in terrorist attack tactics in Iraq, for example, might pass 
without notice in the mind of an intelligence collector, but could have serious 
implications to a field analyst because of a particular facility feature or vulnerability that 
only that analyst would know about. 
 
G. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY? 
The DOE nuclear field sites do not participate in the second and third steps of the 
9/11 protocol; that is, they do not generate adversary “target capabilities lists” based upon 
the scenarios they have developed, nor do they seek intelligence collection against those 
lists.  There is no mechanism in place to allow or cause this collaboration to occur.57  It is 
useful to consider whether this apparent deficiency really matters.  After all, if any 
scenario falls within the bounds of the DBT/ACL, then the sites are required to be 
prepared to defend themselves against that scenario.  It would be pointless, one could 
argue, to ask the intelligence community to gather information on potential attack 
preparations if the sites are already supposed to be able to defend against that scenario.  
The problem with this argument is that it leaves site managers without a collaboration-
enhanced means of prioritizing their own security upgrades, and it leaves headquarters 
managers in an even more difficult situation since they must prioritize all the security 
upgrade requests from multiple sites across the entire DOE complex.  A collaborative 
effort between the VA and intelligence analysts is needed to help sort through the 
scenarios and determine which ones are most likely to occur based upon current 
information.  The second problem with this situation is the absence of the second step of 
                                                 
57 Some components of this security-intelligence interaction might be occurring internally at DOE 
headquarters, but it is not apparent to the field sites, nor is field site perspective part of the discussion. 
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the 9/11 Commission’s recommended approach.  This failure to seek information about 
potential terrorist preparations for attack deprives the intelligence community of a good 
source of potential tasking ideas that could “tune the system” to discover of an attack 
during the planning and preparation stages.  Furthermore, site analysts might help 
generate ideas for new intelligence collection capabilities that do not yet exist, but which 
could provide valuable information to enhance preparedness.  Finally, as adversary 
numbers and capabilities have increased in the DBTs and ACLs since 9/11, and the 
number of challenging scenarios has risen exponentially, it is difficult or impossible to 
know whether the most challenging ones have been thought of yet.  The sites then find 
themselves at the mercy of inspectors and review teams who test the site’s defenses using 
their own favorite scenarios.  But there is no reason to believe that the pet scenarios of a 
review team are any more or less likely to occur than the site’s own scenarios.   
 
H. A PROPOSED MECHANISM TO START COLLABORATION 
This vast multiplication of potential scenarios is just one more reason that it is 
essential for the analysts to get unfiltered data on a regular basis.  This could be done by 
requiring each analyst to spend hours in front of a computer screen each week, looking 
through hundreds of intelligence reports.  Since VA analysis time is in short supply these 
days, this would not be an effective use of resources.  It would be better to have regular 
collaborative meetings between intelligence and VA analysts.  As those two groups begin 
to understand the information needs and capabilities of each other, the intelligence office 
at DOE headquarters would be able to produce or acquire intelligence products that 
would be tailored to the needs of the field analysts.  Even so, the analysts should always 
have on-demand “pull” access to all information that might be of use so they can look for 
new technical, tactical and political developments that could impact their ability to 
defend against the terrorist threat. 
One mechanism that might fulfill this purpose would be the existing Vulnerability 
Assessment Technical Working Group (VATWG), sponsored by DOE headquarters.  The 
VATWG consists of a subset of the site VA analysts who meet once or twice each year to 
discuss the VA process, usually in an unclassified meeting room.  These meetings could 
be turned into collaborative events with intelligence analysts and others who should be 
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involved.  All VATWG participants should be cleared for SCI information, and the 
meeting should be held in an environment where classified information could be 
discussed.  As discussed in the previous chapter, however, this collaboration must be 
carefully planned.  Simply mandating collaboration, without first engendering the vision 
for it, is likely to result in a cynical and detrimental reaction. 
 
I. SUMMARY 
The Department of Energy has, over many years, created a profoundly effective 
approach for hardening its sites against terrorist attacks.  As the threat becomes more 
challenging however, DOE must continue to look for opportunities to increase 
collaboration among all who could contribute to the security planning process, and 
should seek to develop a “common operating picture” among all analysts and managers.  
Information sharing should be dramatically escalated and focused on the needs of the site 
analysts.  A highly collaborative group should be used to help prioritize scenarios and 
proposed upgrades at each site and across the DOE complex.  This would strengthen the 
basis for DOE’s security budget requests and bring more focus to the vulnerability 




If the study of Pearl Harbor has anything to offer for the future, it is this: 
We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it.  No 
magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty.  Our plans must work 
without it.58 
Our adversaries have many ways to continuously probe our open society with 
relative safety and anonymity as they gain a better understanding about the operation of 
our critical infrastructure and protection measures.  We must be just as aggressive in our 
probing to find out what they are learning, how they are applying their knowledge to 
overcome our defenses, and what they are thinking about doing to harm us in the future. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection analysts must carefully analyze their own 
connectedness to the sources of information and collaboration that will maximize their 
situational awareness and “orientation.”  This should include sources who can help them 
identify and challenge internal biases that limit their ability to properly interpret new 
information.  Managers who oversee the work of CIP analysts must do the same, and 
ensure their analysts are not too inwardly focused.   
All CIP analysts must put the 9/11 Commission’s targeted intelligence collection 
process to work, even if it is on a small scale.  The Department of Homeland Security has 
published a set of national planning scenarios, but it is up to the CIP analyst to use a 
variety of sources to help them come up with specific attack modes that fit in with those 
planning scenarios.  Only then can the analysts begin to develop a conceptual version of a 
terrorist’s “target capabilities list” and then request collection of intelligence against 
those lists, where possible.  Collaboration with intelligence personnel in this process can 





                                                 
58 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 401. 
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Analysts must seek innovative ways to harden and monitor our nation’s critical 
infrastructure in order to raise the risk of exposure for the planners of terrorism.  Analysts 
must also keep their law enforcement contacts informed about possible scenarios so they 
might be better attuned to the significance of new information they find during their law 
enforcement activities. 
Finally, analysts and their managers should take to heart the 9/11 Commission’s 
criticism that the greatest failure which permitted the events of September 11, 2001 to 
occur was the failure of imagination.  An organization cannot be expected to create 
imagination where it does not exist nor enforce its effective use.  But any organization 
can at least institutionalize the process of fostering a collaborative environment and 
providing a rich and steady stream of information with which to cultivate imagination.  
Measures such as the ones presented in this thesis cost very little to implement and can 
increase synergy and camaraderie within the intelligence and CIP analyst communities, 
enhance the analysts’ situational awareness, improve their ability to develop imaginative 
yet realistic scenarios (including a greater ability to prioritize scenarios and eliminate 
unrealistic ones), improve the kinds of performance tests they use to measure the 
effectiveness of their protection strategies, and improve their ability to justify protection 
upgrades.  
This thesis ends as it began – with a reminder from the 9/11 Commission that a 
rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we 
lost on September 11, 2001.  We cannot succeed in the mission of preparedness by 
mandating collaboration and information sharing.  Instead, we must make every effort to 
ignite within others the vision of what can be gained through effective co-laboring and 
information sharing.  Only then will we see the formation of a cadre of impassioned 
preparedness planners who will not rest until they see that vision become a reality 
through the constant improvement of our processes, our collaboration and ourselves.  
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